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The increase in the share of high- and low-wage employment at the expense of middle-wage 
employment has been a striking feature of the US economy. We exploit differences across local labor 
markets in the exposure to Global Value Chains (GVCs), Chinese import competition and automation 
to study the drivers of this labor market polarization. Using value added trade data, we are able to 
correctly assign trade-related shocks to local labor markets, based on the source of value added. Across 
the 722 commuting zones that approximate US local labor markets, we find that employment 
polarization is mainly driven by their exposure to automation. GVCs lead to an increase in the 
employment share of relatively high-wage occupations (which we call ‘skill upgrading’), while import 
competition from China leads to an increase in the employment share of relatively low-wage occupations 
(which we call ‘skill downgrading’). Trade as a combination of the two thus may contribute to 
employment polarization but to a lesser extent than automation. 
Keywords 
Global value chains; employment polarization; automation; import competition. 
JEL Classification: F14; F16; E24; J31; O33.
1 Introduction*
Employment polarization – the relative decline in the employment share of middle-skill/middle-
pay jobs and the relative increase in the employment share of low-skill/low-pay and high-
skill/high-pay jobs – has been one of the most striking features of the US labor market in
recent decades (see Autor et al., 2006; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; and Autor and Dorn, 2013).1
The literature has identified various possible drivers of job market polarization, and in
particular three competing explanations. First, routine-biased technological change (RBTC)
(Autor et al., 2003): routine tasks, typically performed by middle-skilled workers, are easier to
automate. Second, offshoring (Blinder and Krueger, 2013): tasks that do not require a presence
of the worker are more prone to be offshored and subsequently imported. This tends to affect
mostly middle-skilled workers. Third, the rise of China (Autor et al., 2015): import competition
from China has particularly hit middle-skilled manufacturing workers.
In this paper, using a standard local labor market approach, we estimate the effect of all
three factors identified in the literature on US labor market polarization. We contribute to the
literature by considering the simultaneous effect of three factors, and by constructing measures
of exposure to Global Value Chains (GVCs) and to Chinese import competition that correctly
assign trade-related shocks to local labor markets, based on the source of value added. Since
we measure employment polarization based on the distribution of wages across occupations, our
approach allows us to draw indirect implications on the drivers of wage inequality in the US.
Using data on 722 commuting zones (which approximate local labor markets), we find
* Without implicating them, we thank Sergi Basco, Giulia Felice, Bernard Hoekman, Doug Nelson, Ariell
Reshef and seminar participants in the GVC Development Report 2019 Background Paper Conference (Beijing),
the European University Institute, the Italian Trade Study Group (Milan), the Sixteenth Annual Ljubljana
Empirical Trade Conference (Izola, Slovenia), the 2019 Congress of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics
(Geneva), and the Seventh IMF/World Bank/WTO Trade Research Workshop (Geneva) for useful comments
and suggestions, as well as Adam Jakubik for invaluable help with data. This paper is not meant to represent
the positions or opinions of the WTO or its members, nor the official position of any WTO staff, and is without
prejudice to members’ rights and obligations under the WTO. All errors are our own.
1 Several papers show that the labor markets of other non-US developed countries have also become polarized
– see Goos and Manning (2007) for the UK; Dustmann et al. (2009) for Germany; Goos et al. (2009) or Michaels
et al. (2014) for most European economies; Harrigan et al. (2016) for France; Keller and Utar (2016) for Denmark.
There is evidence of job polarization also in some developing countries, although job polarization is not widespread
across all developing countries. See Maloney and Molina (2016), World Bank (2016) and Reijnders and de Vries
(2017).
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that employment polarization is mainly driven by their exposure to automation. GVCs lead to
an increase in the employment share of relatively high-wage occupations (which we call ‘skill
upgrading’), while import competition from China leads to an increase in the employment share
of relatively low-wage occupations (which we call ‘skill downgrading’). While the combined
effect of exposure to GVCs and to China is to polarize employment, exposure to automation is
the most important driver of polarization.
This paper is broadly related to the literature on how trade and technology contribute
to within-country inequality (see Helpman, 2018 for a recent overview). The question of how
offshoring, technology and Chinese import competition affected labor market polarization is
also at the core of a recent paper by Breemersch et al. (2017), who however focus on nineteen
European countries. Their analysis, moreover, is at the level of industries, rather than local
labor markets, and does not provide guidance on implications of employment polarization for
wage inequality. Autor et al. (2015), using a local labor market approach, try to disentangle
the relative contributions of trade and technology on labor market outcomes in the US. They
find that employment polarization is due to initial specialization in routine tasks (see also Autor
and Dorn, 2013 for a similar result), while trade depresses employment across all occupational
groups in manufacturing. However, they only consider import competition from China (as in
Autor and Dorn, 2013), while we more broadly take into account various forms of value chain
trade.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the econometric
strategy adopted. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data and present descriptive evidence of the
link between employment polarization and exposure to GVCs, Chinese import competition and
automation across US local labor markets. The results of the empirical analysis are in Section 5,
while Section 6 concludes with a discussion of how the results relate to public attitudes towards
trade and automation in the US.
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2 Econometric strategy
To shed light on the drivers of job market polarization, we exploit differences across local labor
markets in the exposure to GVC integration, Chinese import competition, and automation.
Following the literature (see, for instance, Autor et al., 2013; 2015), US local labor markets are
represented by 722 commuting zones (CZ’s). CZ-level exposure to trade and technology shocks
is determined by initial patterns of industry specialization within each CZ. The key identification
assumption to exploit such CZ-level variation in exposure to trade and technology shocks is that
labor is mobile within CZ’s, and immobile across them. If this were not the case, as argued
by Autor et al. (2015), CZ-specific labor-market shocks would diffuse across space. It is thus
comforting that the literature finds support for this assumption (Topel, 1986; Jean and Katz,
1992; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Autor et al. 2013).
We formulate the following baseline reduced-form equation:
∆Y Si = α + β1GVCi + β2Chinai + β3Automationi + x′iγ + εi, (2.1)
where ∆Y Si is the change of wage group S = {Low, Middle, High } in total employment in CZ i
in a period (for our estimations, the period 2000-2014). The variables of interest are the local
exposure to GVCs (GVCi), the local exposure to Chinese import competition (Chinai), and the
local exposure to automation (Automationi). We additionally include control variables at the
CZ level, as well as Census division dummies (or, in a robustness exercise, State dummies) in
the vector x.2
Employment polarization would be associated with an increase in the share of low-wage
and high-wage groups in total employment, and a contemporaneous decrease in the share of
the middle-wage group. Estimating one equation per each of the three wage groups is therefore
2 Census divisions are the following nine groupings of US states and the District of Columbia: New England,
Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South Atlantic, East South Central, West South
Central, Mountain, and Pacific. Census division dummies – which are added in some specifications in Autor et
al. (2013) and in all specification in Autor et al. (2015) – absorb region-specific trends in the manufacturing
employment. The inclusion of State dummies is a more conservative way of controlling for such trends.
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appropriate to test for employment polarization. In a robustness exercise, we employ a synthetic
index of employment polarization as dependent variable. Following the spirit of Reijnders and
de Vries (2017), this is defined as:
EPi ≡min{γLi , γHi } − γMi (2.2)
where γSi is the percentage points change in the employment share of wage group S in commuting
zone i between 2000 and 2014. As explained by Reijnders and de Vries (2017) (who compute
this index at country-level for forty countries) the EP index is positive if and only if the labor
market in the corresponding commuting zone polarized, and is higher the greater is the fall in
the employment share of the middle-wage group relative to the other two.
2.1 Baseline exposure measures
In this section, we describe in detail the baseline exposure measures.
GVC exposure The baseline GVC exposure measure, GVCi, is local exposure to foreign








∆FVAX USj , (2.3)
where, as in equation (2.1), ∆ is the change between 2000 and 2014. In equation (2.3), FVAX USj
is Foreign Value Added (FVA) in US exports from the source industry j. This measure is
calculated as the sum of FVA in final exports and FVA in intermediate exports. To be more
specific, we use the US as the exporting country (thus the superscript US ), and sum over all
source countries (except the US), all exporting industries and all destination countries.3 We are
left with data at the level of the source industries j’s (i.e. industries from which value added
3 See Section 3 for a description of the data used and their coverage.
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originates).4
Following the methodology of Autor et al. (2013), we assign FVAXj to CZ’s by summing
across all source industries j, weighting the sum by the CZ i’s baseline-year share of national
industry employment in j (Lij/Lj).5 We further normalize by total employment in CZ i (Li).
The measure in (2.3) thus proxies for GVC exposure because it allocates the national change in
industry-level FVAX to CZ’s according to their baseline industry employment structure. More
exposed CZ’s are the ones with initial employment structure relatively more skewed towards j
industries with relatively larger increases in FVAX.
One important difference relative to previous related work (most notably, Autor et al.,
2013) is that we are able to decompose trade flows based on source country and industry of
value added. In doing so, we calculate the exposure measures with j representing industries
where value added originates. This has the advantage to correctly assign trade-related shocks
to CZ’s, since the true set of industries affected by such shocks can be identified. In fact,
FVAX is not the FVA in US exports from the source countries’ industries that is re-exported
by US industries. If, say, foreign industries A and B respectively supply 4$- and 1$-worth
value added to US industry C, and the resulting 5$ end up constituting the foreign value added
embodied in US exports of industry C, we assign FVA values of 4$ and 1$ respectively to US
industries A and B, rather than 5$ to US industry C. This is important to be able to correctly
assign GVC exposure to local labor markets. As explained by Jakubik and Stolzenburg (2018),
goods exported from a downstream industry such as consumer electronics contain inputs from
upstream industries such as plastics and fabricated metal products. When FVA is embodied in
US electronics exports, the competing local labor markets in the US are the ones with relatively
higher share of employment in upstream production activities (plastics and fabricated metal
products), not those with relatively higher share of of employment in downstream production
4 All value added measures needed to build GVC and China exposure are time-varying, since we need compute
their change over time (∆).
5 We use 2000 as baseline year.
European University Institute 5
Revisiting the role of trade and automation in US labor market polarization
activities (consumer electronics).
China exposure The baseline China exposure measure, Chinai, is local exposure to import
competition from China, measured by Chinese domestic value added in China’s exports to the








∆DVA CNj , (2.4)
where DVA CNj is domestic value added in China’s exports to the US from the source industry
j. This measure is calculated as the sum of Domestic Value Added (DVA) embodied in final
exports and DVA in intermediate exports that are used by the US importer to produce local
final products. To be more specific, we use China as the source and exporting country (thus
the superscript CN ), the US as the destination and importing country, and we sum over all
exporting industries.6 We are left with data at the level of the Chinese source industries j’s.
As with the GVC exposure measure, we assign DVAj to CZ’s by summing across all source
industries j, weighting the sum by the CZ i’s baseline-year (i.e. 2000) share of national industry
employment in j (Lij/Lj). We further normalize by total employment in CZ i (Li). The
measure in (2.4) thus allocates the national change in industry-level imported Chinese DVA
to CZ’s according to their baseline industry employment structure. Note, also, that since j
represents industries where value added originates, we are able to correctly assign exposure to
Chinese import competition across local labor markets.
Automation exposure To measure local exposure to automation, Automationi, we follow
Autor et al. (2015). They compute, for each occupation o, a summary measure of routine
task-intensity in 1980 (RTIo). They then classify as routine-intensive occupations those falling
in the top-third of the employment-weighted distribution of the RTI measure in 1980 (i.e., they
create an occupation-based routine task-intensity dummy variable). Finally, they compute, for
6 The data used and their coverage are the same as for the GVC exposure measure – thus reducing the scope
for measurement error – and are described in Section 3.
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each commuting zone i, the fraction of employment at the start of a decade that falls in routine
task-intensive occupations, RSHi. This is the measure of local exposure to automation also used
in this study.7
2.2 Instruments for exposure measures
A concern when estimating the empirical model in (2.1) is the endogeneity of the three main
variables of interest. In particular, there might be unobserved supply and demand shocks that
simultaneously affect the described trade and technology shocks and regional employment. To
deal with this endogeneity problem, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach for the
exposure variables.
GVC exposure To instrument for GVC exposure we follow Kummritz (2016), who applies
Frankel and Romer (1999)’s approach to value added trade data. To get exogenous variation in
value added trade flows, the idea is to use a directional value added trade resistance index that
combines third country bilateral trade costs with the distance between the involved industries
within the value chain.8 The exogenous predictor for trade in value added can then be used to
construct an exogenous measure of CZ-level GVC exposure.
In a first step, we predict bilateral industry-level foreign value added in US exports based
only on determinants exogenous to the US industry j performance:
FVAXjlrt = exp{α + β ln(RIjlrt) + δrt + εjlrt} , (2.5)
where j, r index industries; l indexes countries; t indexes years. In equation (2.5), FVAX jlrt
is the value added of source industry j from country l in the exports of US industry r, and RI
is the value added trade resistance index, which is a product of two terms. The first term is a
7 In particular, we use the measure computed by Autor et al. (2015) for the year 2000.
8 In their seminal paper, Frankel and Romer (1999) used geographical determinants of trade costs to get
exogenous variation in (gross) trade flows.
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This is a weighted average of country l’s bilateral trade costs with all c countries except US,
where the weights are export shares of l to c.9
The second term of RI – industrial distance – is the product of the upstreamness of source
industry j and the downstreamness of using industry r.10
In a second step, we aggregate the fitted values of equation (2.5) across all source l countries














∆FVAX IVj , (2.8)
where, as in equation (2.3), ∆ is the change between 2000 and 2014.11
To boost intuition, consider the following example with four (plus one) countries – China
(C), India (I), Japan (J) and Thailand (T) (plus the Rest of the World, RoW) – and three
industries involved in a Motor vehicles’ value chain – Basic metals (B), Fabricated metals (F)
and Motor vehicles (M). (The example is from Kummritz, 2016). The three industries are
ordered according to their position in the value chain: B is upstream with respect to F and M,
and F is upstream with respect to M. Figure 1 shows a case in which the final product (Motor
vehicles) is manufactured in and exported to RoW by Japan, using Basic metals from India,
9 As explained in Section 3, bilateral trade costs are sourced from the ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost
Database and they represent a geometric average of trade cost from l to c and from c to l.
10 The industry upstreamness and downstreamness indexes are derived from Antràs et al., (2012); Antràs and
Chor (2013); Fally (2012). See equation (6) and Appendix A.3 in Kummritz (2016) for further details.
11 Employment variables in equation (2.8) are for the year 1990. This is similar in spirit to Autor et al (2013),
to take into account reverse causality concerns if employment is affected by anticipated trade shocks.
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as well as Fabricated metals from China and Thailand. Fabricated metals that Japan sources
from China and Thailand are produced using Basic metals that China and Thailand source from
India.
The objective is to find a good instrument for value added in exports, the dependent variable
in (2.5). Value added exports are mechanically equal to the sum of all foreign value added – in
our example, the value added of Japanese exports of M is equal to the sum of the value added
of India’s exports of B to Japan; the value added of C’s exports of F to Japan (which embodies
value added of India’s exports of B to China); and the value added of Thailand’s exports of F
to Japan (which embodies value added from India’s exports of B to Thailand). Focus on India’s
value added in Japanese exports of M. By the very logic of value chains, as shown graphically
in Figure 1 and analytically by Noguera (2012), India’s value added in Japanese exports of M
can be predicted by bilateral trade costs between India and China and by bilateral trade costs
between India and Thailand.12 Such ‘indirect’ bilateral trade costs, being exogenous to the
productivity or value added of the Japanese M industry, are good predictors of the exogenous
component of India’s value added in Japanese exports of M.
The remaining problem for the instrumentation is that trade costs are at bilateral country-
level (see footnote 9), while the instrument for vae in equation (2.5) should vary by countries
and industries. The simple solution is again to use the GVC structure of production, with some
industries being clearly more upstream than others. In the example, B is more upstream than F
when it comes to providing inputs into the production of M. The larger the ‘industrial distance’
between B and M (in Figure 1, inddistBM ), the more likely it is that more intermediate stages
will be performed to transform B’s input into M’s output, and the more likely it is that third
countries will be involved in this longer value chain, therefore the more likely it is that third-
country (i.e. indirect) bilateral trade costs will affect the foreign value added embodied in final
exports. Therefore, an indicator of industrial distance such as the (inverse of) the product of
12 Of course, bilateral trade costs involving Japan are also predictors of Japanese exports of M, but they are
potentially endogenous, so they should not be included in the construction of the instrument.
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the upstreamness of B and the downstreamness of M is interacted with bilateral trade costs to
build the value added trade resistance index. This index, in turn, is a good instrument for value
added exports in equation (2.5).
China exposure To instrument for the exposure to Chinese import competition, we follow the
idea of Autor et al. (2013). We use Chinese domestic value added in exports of goods which are
exported to and consumed in other developed countries (namely, Australia, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Japan, Spain, and Switzerland) as an instrument for Chinese domestic value added
in exports of goods which are exported to and consumed in the US. The instrument for DVA is
calculated as the sum of DVA embodied in final exports and DVA in intermediate exports used
by the direct importer to produce local final products. Again, China is the source and exporting
country, but the destination/importing countries are now the other seven developed countries
rather than the US. When summing over all exporting industries, we get industry data at the









∆DVA IVljt , (2.9)
where DVA IVljt is the instrument for DVA described in the above-paragraph and ∆ is the change
between 2000 and 2014.13
Our instrumentation approach for the China exposure variable follows in spirit the one of
Autor et al. (2013), with some important differences. Autor et al. (2013) use growth in gross
imports from China into eight non-US developed countries as an instrument for the growth in
gross imports from China into the US. They justify their instrument based on the assumption
that growth of Chinese imports in high-income countries other than the US is correlated with
growth in Chinese imports in the US (because they both reflect positive supply shocks in China),
but uncorrelated with shocks in US product demand which also affect the US labor market. A
13 Similarly to the instrument for the GVC exposure measure, employment variables in equation (2.8) are for
the year 1990.
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problem with their approach is that both gross Chinese exports to the US and gross Chinese
exports to non-US developed countries embody US value added. Since US employment is a
major contributor to US value added, and Chinese exports to other countries embody US value
added, Autor et al. (2013)’s instrument is mechanically correlated with US employment and
hence unlikely to be valid (Jakubik and Stolzenburg, 2018).
We only use Chinese domestic value added in exports in the construction of the instrument.
The instrument is therefore relevant insofar the growth of China’s domestic value added em-
bodied in Chinese exports to non-US high-income countries is correlated with growth of China’s
domestic value added embodied in Chinese exports to the US (likely to be true because they both
reflect positive supply shocks in China), and it is valid insofar Chinese domestic value added
embodied in Chinese exports to non-US high-income countries in uncorrelated with shocks in
US product demand (likely to be true because purely Chinese domestic value added does not,
by definition, contain value added from other countries – most notably the US – which might
be correlated with US product demand along value chains).
Automation exposure The exposure to automation is instrumented as in Autor et al. (2015).
They build an instrument for the fraction of employment that falls in routine task-intensive
occupations using historical information from 1950 on the local industry mix and the nationwide
occupational structure of industries. As argued by Autor et al. (2015), the relevance and the
validity of the instrument stem from the fact that it is determined three decades prior to the onset
of rapid computerization in the 1980s, so it should be correlated with the long-run component of
the routine occupation share but uncorrelated with contemporaneous innovations to this share.
2.3 Alternative exposure measures
We present two robustness exercises where we build alternative exposure measures. First, we
construct China exposure in a way similar to what is done in Autor et al. (2013), adapting
the GVC exposure variable accordingly. In the second, we use an alternative GVC exposure
European University Institute 11
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variable, based on foreign value added in US production.
China exposure measure similar to Autor et al. (2013)’s To build their exposure to
Chinese import competition, Autor et al. (2013) rely on gross trade flows. This has several
disadvantages, most notably the fact that it calls into question the validity of their instrument
(see discussion above in this section). We replicate their exercise without introducing mechanical
correlation between US employment and Chinese import competition, and assigning import
competition to industries where value added originates. To this end, we use the sum of all
value added flows contained in the value added decomposition of exports from China to the
US proposed by Koopman et al. (2014) (see Section 3): DVA in intermediate exports used
by the direct importer to produce local final products; DVA embodied in final exports; DVA
in intermediate exports used to produce intermediates that are re-exported to third countries
for production of local final products; DVA first exported but which eventually returns and is
consumed at home; FVA embodied in intermediate exports; FVA embodied in final exports;
pure double counting from domestic source; and pure double counting from foreign sources. We
use China as exporting country and the US as destination country, aggregate over all source
countries and exporting industries, and allocate the resulting (source) industry-level data to
CZ’s using employment shares, as described above.14 Note that we deviate from Autor et al.
(2013) by: 1) not including the US as a source country. This breaks the mechanical mechanical
correlation between US employment and Chinese import competition; and 2) matching source
industries instead of exporting industries to US industries in building China exposure variables.
The construction of the corresponding instrumental variable (which is the variable used in
the robustness exercise) is analogous to the the construction of the baseline instrument for the
China exposure variable described in Section 2.2. That is, we replace US as the destination
country by seven other developed countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan,
14 Recall that our DVA CNj variable used to compute the baseline China exposure variable is just the sum of
DVA embodied in final exports and DVA in intermediate exports that are used by the direct importer to produce
local final products. The problems with double counting are discussed in Jakubik and Stolzenburg (2018).
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Spain, Switzerland) in the aggregation of DVA flows.
We also adjust the GVC exposure variable to avoid any overlap with the China exposure
variable just described. In particular, we subtract from the FVAX measure of Section 2.1






where DVAINT,REX is DVA in intermediate exports used to produce intermediates that are
re-exported to third countries for production of local final products; RDV is DVA first exported
but which eventually returns and is consumed at home; DVAINT is DVA in intermediate exports
used by the direct importer to produce local final products; and FVAINT is FVA embodied in
intermediate exports.15
As usual, we sum over all source countries, destination countries, and exporting industries,
and allocate the resulting source industry-level data to CZ’s using employment shares.
The construction of the corresponding instrumental variable (which is the variable used in
the robustness exercise) is analogous to the the construction of the baseline instrument for the
China exposure variable described in Section 2.2. That is, we replace US as the destination
country by seven other developed countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan,
Spain, Switzerland) in the aggregation of (the modified) FVA flows.16
GVC exposure measure using FVA in production Instead of analyzing the effect of
FVA in US exports, we alternatively look at FVA in US production (FVAY ). The variable is
15 Note that we approximate FVA in Chinese exports which is re-exported by the US by the respective share
in DVA.
16 As a technical note, to build the instrument for FVAX we need to distribute the subtraction term in
equation (2.10) – at the level of source country and source industry – over US exporting industries according to
the distribution of FVA in US exports (intermediates plus final) over US exporting industries. This is because we
need disaggregated data by exporting country, exporting industry, source country, and source industry, while the
subtraction term in (2.10) does not include information on US exporting industries (just on Chinese exporting
industries).
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constructed as follows. First, we build a dataset where the US is the exporting country, all
countries except the US are the source countries, all countries except the US are the destination
countries, and we consider all source and exporting industries. We sum over the following value
added trade flows: DVA in intermediate exports used by the direct importer to produce local
final products; DVA embodied in final exports; DVA in intermediate exports used to produce
intermediates that are re-exported to third countries for production of local final products;
DVA first exported but which eventually returns and is consumed at home; FVA embodied
in intermediate exports; FVA embodied in final exports; pure double counting from domestic
source; and pure double counting from foreign sources. Second, we multiply the resulting VA
trade flows with (US) industry production-to-export ratios (sourced from WIOD data), to get
FVA in US production. Third, we subtract Chinese DVA in intermediate exports that are used
by the direct importer (the US) to produce local final products. This is to avoid overlaps with
the China exposure variable (which incorporates this Chinese DVA in intermediate exports).
The variable FVAY is then constructed in the same way as the baseline GVC exposure
measure FVAX. We sum over all source countries, destination countries, and exporting indus-
tries. The resulting (source) industry data is allocated to CZ’s by using employment shares.
The corresponding IV variable is also constructed in the same way as the IV for the baseline
GVC exposure measure.17
3 Data
The employment data come from the American Community Survey (ACS). By means of various
crosswalks, we map the Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs) available in the ACS data to
17 In this case, too, to construct IV variable corresponding to FVAY we have to distribute the subtraction
term – at the level of source country (China) and source industry – over US exporting industries according to
the distribution of FVA in US production over US exporting industries. This approach is necessary because the
subtraction term does not include information on US exporting industries (just on Chinese exporting industries),
and the required data is disaggregated by exporting country, exporting industry, source country, and source
industry.
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CZ’s.18 Industry-level employment is constructed by reclassifying the ACS data (which com-
prises 246 industries) to the more aggregated industry structure of the trade flow data (56
industries in ISIC Rev. 4).19
The three wage groups are built based on wage data from the Occupational Employment
Statistics (OES) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). We order US Standard Occupational
Classification (SOC) occupations (23 major groups) by their average national wage in 2000.20
As illustrated in Figure 2, the sorting of occupations in the three categories (Low-, Middle- and
High-wage) is straightforward. We match the SOC occupations to those in the ACS by using a
crosswalk from the US Census Bureau.21
Trade flow data (56 industries in ISIC Rev. 4) needed to construct measures of exposure to
GVCs and to Chinese import competition are decomposed by value added using the accounting
framework proposed by Koopman et al. (2014) and provided by the Research Centre for GVCs
at the University of International Business and Economics (UIBE) in Beijing.22
To build the instrument for the GVC exposure, we rely on bilateral trade costs from the
ESCAP-World Bank Trade Cost Database, which are estimated based on the inverse form of
the gravity model developed by Novy (2013). As argued in Section 2, for generic countries a
and b, the bilateral trade cost indicator in this database is the geometric average of ab and
ba tariffs: τab ≡
√
(1 + tariffab) (1 + tariffba), where tariffs are simple average effective import
tariff imposed by the exporting country on the importing country. We match this data with
export shares and industrial distance (the product of the upstreamness of source industries and
18 Crosswalks from 1990 PUMAs (used in ACS data for 1990) to 1990 CZ’s, and from 2000 PUMAs (used in
ACS data for the years 2000 and 2005-2011) to 1990 CZ’s are made public by David Dorn – see www.ddorn.net.
To match 2012 PUMAs (first used in the ACS data in 2012) to 1990 CZ’s, we first use the correspondence between
2012 PUMAs and 2000 PUMAs (‘puma2k puma2010.csv’) made available by the Missouri Census Data Center
(see http://sas.mcdc.missouri.edu/geography/PUMAs.html) and then apply the crosswalk from 2000 PUMAs
to 1990 CZ’s.
19 To do so, we use the following crosswalks: i) industries in ACS–ISIC Rev. 3 (correspondence prepared by
Adam Jakubik); ii) ISIC Rev. 3 – ISIC Rev. 3.1; and iii) ISIC Rev. 3.1 – ISIC Rev. 4. For crosswalks ii) and iii),
correspondences are from the UN Statistics Division (see https://unstats.un.org/unsd/classifications).
20 See Goos et al., (2009) for a similar approach. Note that military-specific occupations are not used in the
analysis because of missing wage data.
21 2010 SOC – 2010 Census, see www.bls.gov/cps/cpsoccind.htm.
22 Appendix Table A-1 provides a list of industries in the trade data, with their ISIC Rev. 4 codes and
description. The raw data are from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), release 2016.
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the downstreamness of using industries), all calculated from the World Input-Output Database
(WIOD).
Data on the CZ-level share of routine employment used to compute exposure to automation,
as well as data used to construct control variables at the CZ level, follow Autor et al. (2015),
and are made public on David Dorn’s website. They are defined in the baseline year (2000),
and include the share of employment in manufacturing, the share of population that is college-
educated, the share of population that is foreign-born, and the female employment rate.
4 Descriptive statistics
We show in Table 1 that our data is consistent with previous studies that documented an
increasing polarization of the US labor market (see Autor et al., 2006; Acemoglu and Autor,
2011; and Autor and Dorn, 2013). The upper panel of the table reports, for each of the five
occupations classified as low-wage, the ten occupations classified as middle-wage and the seven
occupations classified as high-wage, the share in total hours worked in 2000 and in 2014, averaged
across commuting zones. The share in total hours worked was higher in 2014 than in 2000 in
all low-wage occupations and in four high-wage occupations out of seven, while it was lower
in 2014 than in 2000 in six out of ten middle-wage occupations. Occupations that saw the
biggest losses are Office and Administrative Support; Production occupations; and Installation,
Maintenance and Repair. All these fall into the middle-wage category. The biggest gains were
in Food Preparation; Healthcare Practitioners and Technical occupations; Personal Care and
Service occupations; and Management. These occupations fall either into the low-wage or the
high-wage category. It is then not surprising that, on average, as reported in the lower panel
of Table 1, employment shares increased for low- and high-wage occupations and decreased by
the same amount for middle-wage occupations between 2000 and 2014 – indicating that the US
labor market got polarized during this period.
The synthetic Employment Polarization index (equation (2.2)) shows that employment has
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polarized in 643 out of the 722 US commuting zones. As shown in Figure 3, polarization was
highest in the East and lowest in the central part of the country. Polarization varies significantly
across commuting zones even within Census divisions or States.
In Figure 4 we display the geographical distribution across US commuting zones of the three
explanatory variables of interest: exposure to GVCs, exposure to Chinese import competition
and exposure to automation.
A comparison of the three panels of Figure 4 shows that the geographical patterns vary
considerably. While GVCs grew in importance especially in the South and the Mid-West, the
rise in import competition from China was concentrated in the Eastern part. Exposure to
automation was high in the South-West and in the East, especially in the Great Lakes region
and the upper East coast. Note that there is no clear overlap between exposure measures.
Figure 5 shows correlations between the three exposure measures and the Employment
Polarization index of equation (2.2). The only clear correlation is the positive one depicted
in panel (iii) with exposure to automation. There appears to be no relationship between the
exposure to import competition from China and polarization (panel (ii)), while there is a negative
relationship between the exposure to GVCs and polarization (panel (i)), mostly driven by few
CZ’s that experienced very large changes in GVC exposure between 2000 and 2014. We explore
these relationships more formally using regression analysis in the next section.
5 Results
We start with ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions in Table 2. GVC exposure is associated
with a decrease in the employment shares of the low-wage group, and an increase in the em-
ployment share of the high-wage group. This result is consistent with a skill upgrading effect of
GVCs. China exposure is associated with an increase in the employment share of the low-wage
group, consistently with skill downgrading. Exposure to automation, in turn, is associated with
increased in the employment shares of the low-wage and of the high-wage groups, and a decrease
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in the employment share of the middle-wage group. Automation is, therefore, the driver of wage
polarization.
The instrumental variable estimation results which use the exposure variables discussed in
Section 2.2 largely confirm the patterns from the OLS regressions. Table 3 strongly confirms the
results that GVCs are associated with skill upgrading and automation leads to employment po-
larization. Exposure to Chinese import competition, when significant (column (8)), is associated
with skill downgrading.
Standardized beta coefficients presented in Table 3 help get a sense of the relative contri-
bution of the three exposure variables to changes in employment shares across US commuting
zones. In column (3), one can see that the positive effect of automation exposure and of China
exposure on the low-wage group share are very similar in size. The same is true for the positive
effects of GVC exposure and of automation exposure on the high-wage group share (column
(9)). Remarkably, the largest impact across exposure measures and wage groups is the negative
effect of exposure to automation on the middle-wage group share (columns (4) and (6)), which
reinforces the conclusion that automation leads to employment polarization by pushing down
employment in middle-wage occupations.
First-stage results, presented in Appendix Table A-2, are in line with expectations (the in-
struments are all positively and significantly correlated with the variables that they instrument)
and statistically reassuring, with first stage F-test statistics of 57.74, 30.4 and 22.19 respectively
for exposure to GVCs, to China and to automation.23
Table 4 presents the IV results with alternative construction of the GVC and of the China
exposure variables.24 In columns (1)-(3), the China exposure is built in a way similar to Autor
et al. (2013)’s, and the GVC exposure variable is adjusted accordingly (see discussion in the first
part of Section 2.3). (The variable for automation exposure remains the same as in Table 3). As
in baseline results, GVC exposure decreases the employment share of low-wage occupations and
23 These F-test statistics refer to the estimations in columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table 3.
24 In the remainder, we present regressions with all the three main variabes of interest included.
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increases the employment share of high-wage occupations. The impact of exposure to China
loses statistical significance for any wage group. This might indicate that any ‘China-shock’
effects are sensitive, among others, to how the China shock is measured. Finally, exposure
to automation significantly reduces middle-wage occupations’ employment shares, and increase
employment shares of low- and high-wage occupations (although the results in columns (1) and
(3) are only significant at the 15%). Qualitatively, therefore, regressions of columns (1)-(3)
of Table 4 confirm the skill-upgrading effect of GVCs and the employment polarizing effect of
automation.
Columns (4)-(6) of Table 4 display IV results using foreign value added in US production,
rather than in US exports, as relevant variable to construct GVC exposure (see discussion in
the second part of Section 2.3). (The variables for China exposure and for automation exposure
remain the same as in Table 3). The results when using FVA in production are qualitatively
the same as, and quantitatively very similar to, the baseline IV results of Table 3.
Next, we estimated regressions using the EP index of (2.2) as dependent variable. The
results are displayed in Table 5. Across the four specifications – OLS with the baseline exposure
measures of Section 2.1 in column (1), IV with the baseline exposure measures of Section 2.2
in column (2), IV with the alternative exposure measures of Section 2.3 in columns (3) and (4)
– it can be seen that exposure to automation is the driver of employment polarization. This
is consistent with the descriptive evidence presented in Figure 4, as well as with the regression
results using shares of wage groups in total employment as dependent variable presented so far.
All the results presented so far include Census division dummies. We also performed regres-
sions using a richer set of geographical dummies, namely State dummies. The results, presented
in Appendix table A-3, largely confirm the results with Census division dummies.
Finally, we also computed employment variables as shares of total hours worked rather than
shares of total employment. The results – available in Appendix table A-4 – are in line with the
results that use shares of employment.
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5.1 Employment levels
In Table 6, we present results for the levels of total employment and employment by skill group.
These results shed more light on the mechanisms that drive the change in employment shares.
First, in line with Autor et al. (2013), the exposure to Chinese import competition decreases
total employment in the exposed local labor market. This is moslty due to a decline in high-skill
employment (column (4)). Hence, our baseline result that Chinese import competition leads to
an increased share of low-skill workers in total employment is not driven by an actual increase
in low-skill employment but rather by a decrease in the employment of other skill categories.
Second, GVC exposure has the exact opposite effect on the numbers of employed workers. It
does not significantly decrease low-skill employment while it increases the employment of high
skill workers, leading to an increase in total employment in the local labor market and shifting
the employment share from low-skill to high-skill workers. Finally, automation does not have a
systematic effect on the overall employment levels. Rather, it changes the skill composition of
the employed workforce in line with our baseline results.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that in US local labor markets employment polarization is mostly driven by
automation. Since our measure of employment polarization is based on wages, one implication
of our research is that technology is the driving force behind wage inequality.
Our results are consistent with a large body of research – surveyed in Helpman (2018)
– finding that globalization in the form of foreign trade and offshoring has not been a large
contributor to rising inequality, even across US regions.
It is interesting to discuss the results of this paper in relation to public attitudes towards
trade and automation. Despite the received wisdom of a general backslash against globalization,
public attitudes towards trade are positive in the United States. 74% of US respondents to the
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latest PEW Global Attitudes Survey agreed that growing trade and business ties with other
countries is a good thing for the US, up from 68% in 2014. Moreover, the majority of US
respondents (36%) think that trade creates jobs (as opposed to trade destroying jobs – 34% – or
trade does not making a difference in terms of jobs – 24%). And US respondents are equally split
between those who argue that trade increase wages and those who argue that trade decrease
wages (31% each), while 30% of respondents think that trade does not make a difference in
terms of wages (Pew Research Center, 2018).
Public attitudes towards job automation, on the other hand, show that people in the United
States are well aware of the link between job automation and increasing inequality. 76% of US
respondents to the latest PEW Global Attitudes Survey agreed that the inequality between the
rich and poor would increase with further job automation (Pew Research Center, 2018).25
Our results might help explain why attitudes towards the labor market effects of trade are
neutral if not positive, while attitudes towards the effects of job automation on inequality are
negative in the US.
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ivaeBIMJ,FT = f (τIT, τTJ, inddistBM)
ivaeBIMJ,FC = f (τIC, τCJ, inddistBM)
Exports
to RoW
dvaeBIMJ = f (τIJ, inddistBM)
Notes: Derived from Table 1 in Kummritz (2016). dvaeBIMJ is the direct value added of I’s exports of B to J. It is a
function of direct bilateral IJ trade costs, τIJ and the ‘industrial distance’ between B and the final export industry
M, inddistBM. ivaeBIMJ,FC is the indirect value added of I’s exports of B to J, embodied in C’s exports of F to J. It
is a function of indirect bilateral IC and CJ trade costs, τIC and τCJ , and the ‘industrial distance’ between B and
the final export industry M, inddistBM. Similarly, ivaeBIMJ,FT is the indirect value added of I’s exports of B to J,
embodied in T’s exports of F to J. It is a function of indirect bilateral IT and TJ trade costs, τIT and τTJ, and the
‘industrial distance’ between B and the final export industry M, inddistBM.
European University Institute 25
Revisiting the role of trade and automation in US labor market polarization























0 10 20 30 40






Computer and Mathematical Occupations
Architecture and Engineering Occupations
Business and Financial Operations Occupations
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical Occupations
Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media Occupations
Education, Training, and Library Occupations
Construction and Extraction Occupations
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Occupations
Community and Social Services Occupations
Protective Service Occupations
Sales and Related Occupations
Production Occupations
Office and Administrative Support Occupations
Transportation and Material Moving Occupations
Healthcare Support Occupations
Personal Care and Service Occupations
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance Occupations
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry Occupations
Food Preparation and Serving Related Occupations
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. Low-wage occupations
in the upper panel, Middle-wage occupations in the central panel, High-wage occupations in the lower
panel. See Table 1 for the corresponding Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). EP defined in equation (2.2), GVC exposure defined
in equation (2.3), China exposure defined in equation (2.4), and exposure to automation
defined in equation (2) of Autor et al. (2015). Each area is a commuting zone.
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS),
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the UIBE Research Centre for GVCs and David Dorn’s
webpage (www.ddorn.net). GVC exposure defined in equation (2.3), China exposure defined
in equation (2.4), and automation exposure defined in equation (2) of Autor et al. (2015).
Each area is a commuting zone.
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(iii) Automation exposure
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS), the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), the UIBE Research Centre for GVCs and David Dorn’s webpage (www.ddorn.net). EP index defined in equation
(2.2), GVC exposure defined in equation (2.3), China exposure defined in equation (2.4), and automation exposure defined
in equation (2) of Autor et al. (2015). Each data point is a commuting zone.
Table 1: Changes in the employment composition, 2000-2014
Occupation SOC code Share in 2000 Share in 2014 Wage group
Food Preparation and Serving Related 35 3.85 4.87 Low
Farming, Fishing, and Forestry 45 0.77 0.85 Low
Building and Grounds Cleaning and Maintenance 37 2.84 3.55 Low
Personal Care and Service 39 2.25 3.11 Low
Healthcare Support 31 1.81 2.24 Low
Transportation and Material Moving 53 6.54 6.65 Middle
Office and Administrative Support 43 14.36 12.17 Middle
Production 51 8.93 6.60 Middle
Sales and Related 41 10.78 10.06 Middle
Protective Service 33 2.11 2.38 Middle
Community and Social Services 21 1.50 1.67 Middle
Installation, Maintenance, and Repair 49 4.46 3.53 Middle
Construction and Extraction 47 5.89 5.49 Middle
Education, Training, and Library 25 5.38 5.81 Middle
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports, and Media 27 1.84 1.80 Middle
Life, Physical, and Social Science 19 0.96 0.87 High
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical 29 4.70 5.94 High
Business and Financial Operations 13 4.50 4.96 High
Architecture and Engineering 17 2.24 1.95 High
Computer and Mathematical 15 2.58 2.93 High
Management 11 10.51 11.37 High
Legal 23 1.20 1.18 High




Notes: Authors’ calculations based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS), the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) and David Dorn’s webpage (www.ddorn.net). SOC stands for Standard Occupational Classification. Shares in 2000
and 2014 expressed as percentages of total usual hours worked per week. In the upper panel, shares are weighted averages
across commuting zones (with CZ population in 2000 as weights). In the lower panel, shares are weighted averages across
occupations belonging to the same wage group and across commuting zones (with CZ population in 2000 as weights). See
Figure 2 for the classification of occupations into wage groups.
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Table 4: IV estimations with alternative GVC and China exposure variables















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GVC exposure -0.0035* -0.0038 0.0073*** -0.0003*** -0.0002 0.0005***
(0.0019) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
China exposure 0.0009 0.0010 -0.0019 0.0014** 0.0001 -0.0015
(0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Automation exposure 0.1657 -0.4345*** 0.2687 0.1717* -0.4723*** 0.3005*
(0.1014) (0.1393) (0.1694) (0.0971) (0.1339) (0.1653)
Standardized beta coefficients
GVC exposure -0.371 -0.329 0.713 -0.355 -0.164 0.509
China exposure 0.316 0.281 -0.609 0.402 0.031 -0.402
Automation exposure 0.294 -0.616 0.434 0.305 -0.670 0.486
N 722 722 722 722 722 722
R2 0.325 0.179 0.160 0.323 0.206 0.201
F-test of excluded instruments 25.84 17.05 15.77 60.53 28.71 22.07
Notes: ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05,∗∗∗p<0.01. State-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: Dependent
variable: change in the share in total employment of the respective wage group between 2000 and 2014. Columns (1)-(3):
GVC exposure and China exposure measures presented in Section 2.3 (‘China exposure measure similar to Autor et al.
(2013)’s’). Columns (4)-(6): GVC exposure presented in Section 2.3 (‘GVC exposure measure using FVA in production’);
China exposure defined in equation (2.9). Automation exposure defined in equation (3) of Autor et al. (2015) for all
columns. Census division dummies and the following CZ-level controls included in all regressions: manufacturing share
of employment in 2000, share of population with college education in 2000, share of foreign-born population in 2000, and
female employment rate in 2000. F-test of excluded instruments is the Sanderson-Windmeijer F statistics (Sanderson and
Windmeijer, 2016).
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Table 5: Estimations with the EP index
Baseline OLS Baseline IV IV with Autor et
al. (2013) China
exposure
IV with FVA in
production
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GVC exposure -0.0019 0.0026 0.0053 0.0002
(0.0015) (0.0026) (0.0045) (0.0003)
China exposure 0.0015 0.0000 -0.0011 0.0001
(0.0009) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0020)
Automation exposure 0.5017*** 0.9301*** 0.8785*** 0.9301***
(0.0759) (0.2509) (0.2566) (0.2508)
Standardized beta coefficients
GVC exposure -0.120 0.162 0.289 0.149
China exposure 0.220 0.005 -0.201 0.018
Automation exposure 0.450 0.833 0.787 0.833
N 722 722 722 722
R2 0.304 0.219 0.208 0.219
Notes: ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05,∗∗∗p<0.01. State-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: Employment
Polarization (EP) index, defined in equation (2.2). Column (1): GVC exposure defined in equation (2.3), China exposure
defined in equation (2.4), and automation exposure defined in equation (2) of Autor et al. (2015). Column (2): GVC
exposure defined in equation (2.8), China exposure defined in equation (2.9), and automation exposure defined in equation
(3) of Autor et al. (2015). Column (3): GVC exposure and China exposure presented in Section 2.3 (‘China exposure
measure similar to Autor et al. (2013)’s’); automation exposure defined in equation (3) of Autor et al. (2015). Column
(4): GVC exposure presented in Section 2.3 (‘GVC exposure measure using FVA in production’); China exposure defined
in equation (2.9); automation exposure defined in equation (3) of Autor et al. (2015). Census division dummies and the
following CZ-level controls included in all regressions: manufacturing share of employment in 2000, share of population
with college education in 2000, share of foreign-born population in 2000, and female employment rate in 2000. F-test of
excluded instruments presented in the last row of Table A-2 for the regressions of column (2), and in the last row of Table
4 for the regressions of columns (3-4).
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Table 6: IV employment level estimations
Total employed Low employed Medium employed High employed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GVC exposure 0.0072*** -0.0008 0.0029 0.0051***
(0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0013)
China exposure -0.0028** 0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0018**
(0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0009)
Automation exposure -0.0606 0.1481** -0.4093*** 0.2007
(0.1640) (0.0640) (0.1253) (0.1290)
Standardized beta coefficients
GVC exposure 0.420 -0.122 0.209 0.801
China exposure -0.383 0.254 -0.272 -0.691
Automation exposure -0.051 0.343 -0.425 0.457
N 722 722 722 722
R2 0.693 0.451 0.654 0.034
Notes: ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05,∗∗∗p<0.01. State-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: change in
the share in total employment of the respective wage group between 2000 and 2014. GVC exposure defined in equation (2.3),
China exposure defined in equation (2.4), and automation exposure defined in equation (2) of Autor et al. (2015). Census
division dummies and the following CZ-level controls included in all regressions: manufacturing share of employment in
2000, share of population with college education in 2000, share of foreign-born population in 2000, and female employment
rate in 2000.
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Appendix Table A-1: Industry codes and description
ISIC Rev. 4 Description
A01 Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities
A02 Forestry and logging
A03 Fishing and aquaculture
B Mining and quarrying
C10-C12 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products
C13-C15 Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products
C16 Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture;
manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials
C17 Manufacture of paper and paper products
C18 Printing and reproduction of recorded media
C19 Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
C20 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
C21 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations
C22 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
C23 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
C24 Manufacture of basic metals
C25 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
C26 Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products
C27 Manufacture of electrical equipment
C28 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
C29 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
C30 Manufacture of other transport equipment
C31-C32 Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing
C33 Repair and installation of machinery and equipment
D35 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply
E36 Water collection, treatment and supply
E37-E39 Sewerage; waste collection, treatment and disposal activities; materials recovery;
remediation activities and other waste management services
F Construction
G45 Wholesale and retail trade and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles
G46 Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
G47 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
H49 Land transport and transport via pipelines
H50 Water transport
H51 Air transport
H52 Warehousing and support activities for transportation
H53 Postal and courier activities
I Accommodation and food service activities
J58 Publishing activities
J59-J60 Motion picture, video and television programme production, sound recording and
music publishing activities; programming and broadcasting activities
J61 Telecommunications
J62-J63 Computer programming, consultancy and related activities; information service activities
K64 Financial service activities, except insurance and pension funding
K65 Insurance, reinsurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security
K66 Activities auxiliary to financial services and insurance activities
L68 Real estate activities
M69-M70 Legal and accounting activities; activities of head offices; management consultancy activities
M71 Architectural and engineering activities; technical testing and analysis
M72 Scientific research and development
M73 Advertising and market research
M74-M75 Other professional, scientific and technical activities; veterinary activities
N Administrative and support service activities
O84 Public administration and defence; compulsory social security
P85 Education
Q Human health and social work activities
R-S Other service activities
T Activities of households as employers;
undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households for own use
U Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD), release 2016.
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Appendix Table A-2: First stage IV results
Dependent: GVC exposure China exposure Automation exposure
(1) (2) (3)
GVC exposure IV 3.7234*** -1.5007* 0.0104
(0.5147) (0.7889) (0.0150)
China exposure IV 0.2788*** 0.9170*** -0.0013
(0.0450) (0.0539) (0.0015)
Automation exposure IV 2.1677* 4.7845*** 0.1621***
(1.1430) (1.3083) (0.0395)
N 722 722 722
F-test of excluded instruments 57.74 30.40 22.19
Notes: ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05,∗∗∗p<0.01. State-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. First-stage regressions of columns
(1), (2) and (3) respectively correspond to the IV estimations in columns (4), (8) and (12) of Table 3. Census division
dummies and the following controls included in all regressions: manufacturing share of employment in 2000, share of
population with college education in 2000, share of foreign-born population in 2000, and female employment rate in 2000.
F-test of excluded instruments is the Sanderson-Windmeijer F statistics (Sanderson and Windmeijer, 2016).
Appendix Table A-3: IV estimations with State dummies
Low-wage group Middle-wage group High-wage group
(1) (2) (3)
GVC exposure -0.0033*** -0.0006 0.0039**
(0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0019)
China exposure 0.0016* -0.0005 -0.0010
(0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0015)
Automation exposure 0.2765*** -0.5972*** 0.3207
(0.1046) (0.1814) (0.2193)
Standardized beta coefficients
GVC exposure -0.398 -0.062 0.434
China exposure 0.454 -0.127 -0.269
Automation exposure 0.491 -0.847 0.518
N 722 722 722
R2 0.453 0.338 0.327
Notes: ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05,∗∗∗p<0.01. State-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: change in
the share in total employment of the respective wage group between 2000 and 2014. GVC exposure defined in equation
(2.3), China exposure defined in equation (2.4), and automation exposure defined in equation (2) of Autor et al. (2015).
State dummies and the following CZ-level controls included in all regressions: manufacturing share of employment in 2000,
share of population with college education in 2000, share of foreign-born population in 2000, and female employment rate
in 2000.
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Appendix Table A-4: IV estimations with shares in total hours worked
Low-wage group Middle-wage group High-wage group
(1) (2) (3)
GVC exposure -0.1097** -0.0650 0.1747***
(0.0456) (0.0614) (0.0596)
China exposure 0.0526* 0.0166 -0.0692
(0.0281) (0.0507) (0.0493)
Automation exposure 0.0835 -0.4316*** 0.3482*
(0.1051) (0.1309) (0.1793)
Standardized beta coefficients
GVC exposure -0.401 -0.170 0.483
China exposure 0.423 0.096 -0.422
Automation exposure 0.159 -0.590 0.503
N 722 722 722
R2 0.323 0.214 0.236
Notes: ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05,∗∗∗p<0.01. State-level clustered standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: share in
total hours worked of the respective wage group. GVC exposure defined in equation (2.3), China exposure defined in
equation (2.4), and automation exposure defined in equation (2) of Autor et al. (2015). Census division dummies and the
following CZ-level controls included in all regressions: manufacturing share of employment in 2000, share of population
with college education in 2000, share of foreign-born population in 2000, and female employment rate in 2000.




Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute 
Villa Schifanoia, Via Boccaccio 121 
I- 50133 Firenze  
Email: cosimo.beverelli@eui.eu 
Economic Research Division 
World Trade Organization 
Rue de Lausanne 154 




Economic Research Division 
World Trade Organization 
Rue de Lausanne 154 




Economic Research Division 
World Trade Organization 
Rue de Lausanne 154 




Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) 
University of Düsseldorf 
Universitätsstr. 1 
D-40225 Düsseldorf 
Email: woessner@dice.hhu.de 
